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ABSTRACT:  Southern  European  countries  have  come  to  constitute  the  most  vulnerable 
external border of the European Union (EU) over the last decade. Irregular migration pressures 
have  been  acutely  felt  on  the  EU’s  southern  sea  borders,  and  particularly  on  four  sets  of 
islands: Canary  Islands  (Spain),  Lampedusa  and  Linosa (Italy), Malta,  and Aegean  Islands 
(Greece). This quartet is, to a large extent, used as stepping stones by irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers to reach the European continent. This paper studies the role of these islands as 
‘outposts’  of  a  framework  of  externalization.  It  starts  by  discussing  the  notion  of 
externalization  and  its  different  facets.  It  considers  how  externalization  is  linked  to  both 
fencing and gate keeping strategies of migration and asylum control. The second part of the 
paper focuses on the special role of the island quartet with respect to the externalization web 
cast by national and EU wide migration policies. It concludes with a critical reflection on the 
multi level character of externalization policies and practices that occur both within the EU and 
between the EU and third countries.  
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Introduction: the challenge of migration at the EU’s southern sea borders 
 
The European Union has paid increasing attention to the management of its external borders 
with a view to preventing and combating irregular migration. This has been an issue of top 
priority  prior  to  the  2004  enlargement,  enhancing  cooperation  and  mutual  training  among 
border patrols in the EU 27, providing new member states in Central Eastern Europe with 
sophisticated  equipment  and  advanced  know  how.  Moreover,  a  European  Neighbourhood 
Policy has been established which mainly aims at promoting friendly relations, political and 
economic stability in the EU’s Eastern European ‘neighbourhood’ and thus both preventing 
immigration flows as well as externalizing their management and control to the neighbouring 
countries  before  irregular  immigrants  reach  the  EU  external  borders.  The  European 
Neighbourhood policy has been expanded to include the countries south of the EU in 2006 
2007, when actually the focus of irregular migration concerns was at the western part of the 
Mediterranean and more specifically on Spain and the Canary islands. 
  Since 2006, the management of sea borders and in particular the role of islands as 
stepping stones to continental Europe has attracted increasing attention (also Bernardie Tahir 
& Schmoll, 2014; Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012). Indeed, 2006 can be signalled as the 
crisis year which marked a new period in South to North flows across the Mediterranean sea. A. Triandafyllidou 
 
  8
Four sets of islands, belonging to four different countries have become important stepping 
stones in the Mediterranean.  
First, the Canary Islands, in the Atlantic, form part of Spanish territory and have been a 
preferred  target  destination  for  thousands  of  irregular  migrants  sailing  off  the  shore  of 
Mauritania and Senegal for a week long journey to Tenerife. Irregular migrants apprehended 
upon arrival at the Canary islands have significantly fluctuated during the last decade, from 
less than 1,000 in 1999 up to 32,000 in 2006, and to a mere 340 people in 2011.  
  The second set of islands that has probably attracted the largest number of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers during the last decade is the small island of Lampedusa (4,500 
inhabitants),  south  of  Sicily,  and  even  smaller  Linosa  (450  inhabitants),  situated  between 
Lampedusa  and  Malta.  Lampedusa  has  been  receiving  approximately  15,000  to  20,000 
irregular immigrants and asylum seekers per year throughout the decade. Arrivals soared to 
more than 30,000 in 2008 but were reduced to less than 1,000 people in 2010 after the accords 
between the Italian and Libyan governments in 2009. Irregular migration and asylum seeker 
flows however soared again, to more than 51,000 arrivals, in the period January to September 
2011 as a result of the Arab Spring turmoil in Tunisia and the civil war in Libya. While arrivals 
went down to approximately 15,000 in 2012, they have picked up again during 2013 to over 
30,000 in the first 8 months of the year. 
Some of the vessels setting off from northern Africa to Italy have been reaching the 
island state of Malta (also Mainwaring, this special issue). As a result, Malta has received some 
1,500 to 2,000 irregular migrants and asylum seekers per year since 2002, a significantly large 
number for a small and overpopulated island that has a total of 420,000 inhabitants.  
  The fourth set of islands that has become an important stepping stone to continental 
Europe are some of the Aegean islands of Greece. They have been a target destination for 
mainly  Asian  but  also  African  irregular  immigrants and  asylum  seekers  that  seek  to  enter 
Europe through Turkey and cross the narrow straits from Turkish mainland to the islands of 
Mytilini  (Lesvos)  or  Chios.  Numbers  of  apprehended  migrants  and  asylum  seekers  rose 
dramatically in the middle of the decade to an all time high of over 30,000 apprehensions in 
2008, fell significantly to 1,000 in 2011, but picked up again during 2012 to reach more than 
5,000 in the first 8 months of 2013. 
  This paper focuses on the islands as sites where the externalization of European asylum 
and  migration  policies  unfolds.  It  starts  by  elaborating  upon  the  notion  of  externalization, 
arguing  that  it  comes  in  different  guises  and  dimensions:  there  may  be,  for  instance,  an 
externalization of border controls (a fencing policy); or an externalization of asylum seeking or 
readmission (a  gate keeping policy).  I  thus consider the role of the islands in this web of 
externalization policies and practices, seeking to investigate the immediate and remote control 
aspects of externalization policies and practices. The islands thus serve as a case in point to 
understand better the modalities of externalization and the multiple forms that it can take. 
The paper is organized as follows: section two elaborates on the notion and practice of 
externalization  in  its  different  facets.  While  section  three  reviews  the  size  and  features  of 
irregular migration and  asylum seeking flows  at the southern sea borders of the European 
Union and specifically on the Canary Islands, Lampedusa and Linosa, Malta and the Aegean 
Islands  and  the  policies  adopted  to  confront  these  flows  in  each  set  of  islands.  In  the 
concluding  section,  I  discuss  what  are  the  multiple  layers  and  different  practices  of 
externalization of EU migration and asylum policies at the islands, given their geographical 
position at the ‘edge’ of Europe.                                                          Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum 
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Externalization of EU migration and asylum policies at the southern European islands 
 
The  ‘external  dimension’  of  EU  policies  on  migration  and  asylum  is  neither  a  new 
phenomenon nor a new topic of research. The need for extraterritorial control of asylum and 
migration and the links between migration or asylum policies and development aid or overall 
economic  and  political  cooperation  with  countries  of  origin  have  been  underlined  by  the 
European Parliament and the European Commission as early as 1987 (European Parliament, 
1987).  However,  the  ‘external  dimension’  of  EU  migration  and  asylum  control  became  a 
priority in 1999 with the Tampere Council conclusions. The Presidency conclusions stated that 
these  concerns  ‘should  be  integrated  in  the  definition  and  implementation  of  other  Union 
policies  and  activities’  including  external  relations  (Lavenex,  2006,  p.  333).  The  Seville 
Council Conclusions in 2002 stated that ‘each future EU association or cooperation agreement 
should include a clause on “joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission 
in  the  event  of  illegal  immigration”’  (cited  in  Lavenex,  2006,  p.  342).  Partnership  with 
countries  of  origin  figured  prominently  in  the  Hague  (2004)  and  Stockholm  (2008)  home 
affairs programs. 
  One of the early forms of externalization was the adoption of the ‘safe third country’ 
rule (Lavenex, 1999) which became the ‘first safe country’ principle introduced in the Dublin 
Convention of 1990 and further reaffirmed in the Dublin II Regulation of 2003 and in Dublin 
III Regulation of June 2013, which govern the asylum protocol in the EU today. During the 
enlargement  negotiations,  strict  border  controls  became  a  conditionality  principle  for  the 
Central  European  countries  that  were  joining  the  EU.  The  externalization  of  European 
migration policies has been an integral part of  the European Neighbourhood Policy which 
initially was implemented in the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU but was expanded to the 
South since 2007, incorporating the previously inter governmental initiatives of the Barcelona 
process  and  the  Euro Mediterranean  partnership  into  a  Community  framework 
(Triandafyllidou  &  Ilies,  2010).  The  setting  up  of the  Frontex  agency  in  2006  has  further 
boosted the externalization of border controls since Frontex operations involved cooperation 
among specific countries of origin, a European country of destination and several member 
states which sent material and human resources to participate in the Frontex operations. Thus 
while Frontex has been created to assist and coordinate the management of the EU’s external 
borders, it has also become a factor in the web of the externalization policies of the EU. In 
mid 2000s,  the  idea  of  creating  off shore  asylum  reception  centres  where  asylum  seekers 
would be detained while their claims would be assessed, without thus accessing EU territory, 
was  pushed  forward  by  Britain,  Italy  and  Germany  (Papagianni,  2006).  Eventually  such 
reception centres in third countries were not created; but these early developments showed how 
much several member states favoured the idea of externalizing asylum policy through creating 
extra  territorial  transit  spaces  where  asylum  could  be  managed.  Indeed  the  idea  was 
fundamentally at odds with the principles of liberal democracies as it involved that one state 
would apply its jurisdiction and pay for these centres which would however be located in the 
territory of another state. 
  In  this  paper,  I  suggest  that  we  should  distinguish  between  different  types  of 
externalization of migration and asylum policies in relation to their more specific areas of 
concern. Notably, we can speak of externalization of border controls, of return/readmission, 
and  of  asylum  policies.  Within  each  of  these  externalization  domains,  we  can  distinguish A. Triandafyllidou 
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between fencing and gate keeping policies. Gate keeping policies aim at restricting practical 
legal  access  to  a  nation  and  its  institutions,  while  fencing  measures  actively  target  illegal 
migrants  in  order  to  arrest  and  then  expel  them.  Typically,  gate keeping  involves  paper 
controls of people who seek to enter a country or who come voluntarily forward, while fencing 
involves detecting persons in hiding and trying to deter/stop those who seek to enter without 
appropriate  authorization  (Vogel,  2000;  Triandafyllidou  &  Ambrosini,  2011).  Thus,  for 
instance, EU neighbouring countries should guard their borders better so less (irregular/transit) 
migrants  arrive  at  the  EU  external  border.  This  can  be  done  by  neighbouring  countries 
modifying their visa regimes towards other third countries (gate keeping) or by building border 
control  capacity  (human  resources,  ICT  equipment,  other  technical  equipment)  (fencing 
policies).  
  Before  turning  to  the  irregular  migration  and  asylum  seeking  management  on  the 
islands, it is important to note that some externalization of migration controls is necessary as it 
is impossible to guard a border from one side only. Actually it is only authoritarian regimes 
that can seal their borders. Liberal democratic states always have more or less porous borders 
as they are constrained by organised interests and civil liberties’ traditions in their efforts to 
reject  unwanted  migrants  (Freeman,  1995;  Guiraudon  &  Lahav,  2000).  Enlisting  the 
cooperation  of  third  countries  means  more  development  aid  for  them  and  more  capacity 
building and to some extent some policy transfer concerning human rights standards. However, 
conditionality arrangements are often unrealistic because they pose too many requirements to 
countries  of  origin  and  transit  than  these  last  cannot  fulfil  (e.g.  Triandafyllidou,  2009  on 
mobility  partnerships).  The  externalization  of  EU  migration  and  asylum  policies  actually 
prioritises  control  and  efficiency  over  such  other  policy  considerations  as  respect  for 
fundamental rights, the right to asylum and overall concerns for social inequality between the 
global North and the global South. 
 
Southern European islands as pivotal zones of control 
 
In the sections that follow, I present the main irregular migration and asylum seeking flows to 
Europe’s southern islands. The policies adopted by the states to which they belong to manage 
irregular migration flows are critically discussed. 
 
Spain and the Canary islands 
 
In  1999,  Spain  inaugurated  the  SIVE  (Sistema  Integrado  de  Vigilancia  Exterior),  a 
sophisticated system of electronic surveillance, with the aim to protect the southern coast of 
Spain and the Gibraltar strait from irregular migrant arrivals. Border surveillance and controls 
would not have been effective however if Spain had not managed to enlist the cooperation of 
Morocco in re admitting its nationals. Until 2004, Moroccan authorities refused to readmit 
irregular migrants apprehended at the Spanish sea borders coming from Morocco unless they 
were  its  own  nationals.  However,  under  pressure  from  the  EU,  the  Moroccan  government 
accepted to readmit sub Saharan Africans to its territory with a view to then returning them to 
their  own  countries  of  origin.  Μorocco  also  restricted  its  visa  allowances  for  sub Saharan 
African countries under pressure from Spain, so as to reduce transit migration through the 
country (Carling, 2007a). Thus, while during the period of 2002 2004 less than one third of the 
expulsion orders issued were executed, the rate rose to 92% in 2007 (Spanish Interior Ministry,                                                         Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum 
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2008,  cited  in  Gonzalez  Enriquez,  2009).  Irregular  entry  from  Morocco  was  thus  greatly 
reduced, while the pateras crossing the Gibraltar strait (only 9 miles wide) were systematically 
detected and their passengers returned to Morocco (Gonzalez Enriquez, 2008; Carling, 2007b). 
 
Table 1: Migrants apprehended at sea borders, Spain: 1999-2011. 
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Source: Data for 1999 2010 based on Triandafyllidou & Maroukis (2012), Table 2.1, p. 37. 
Data for 2011 based on data provided by the Spanish Coastguard authorities. Retrieved from 
http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2012/02/13/increase in numbers of migrants reaching 
spanish coast in 2011/, emphasis added. Note: n/a = not available. 
 
The better patrolling of the Moroccan Mediterranean coast led to the diversion of migrant 
routes southwards to the Atlantic coast of Morocco and further south, in the period 2006 2008, 
to Mauritania, Senegal and lately Gambia (see Map 1 below). The crossing was no longer to 
the southern Spanish region of Andalucia but to the Canary Islands in the Atlantic (which are 
also Spanish territory), at some 1,000 km (620 miles) west off the African coast. The Red 
Crescent organization in Mauritania estimated that, in the January May 2006 period, at least 
1,600 persons had died attempting the sea crossing (Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012). 
Alongside increased efforts to effectively patrol not only the Gibraltar straits but also 
the  Mauritanian  and  Senegalese  coasts  in  cooperation  with  Mauritanian  and  Senegalese 
authorities and Frontex forces, the Spanish government undertook a ‘diplomatic offensive’ in 
West Africa. During 2007 2009, Spain signed readmission agreements with Cape Verde, Mali, 
Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria and varied forms of cooperation agreements with 
other states in the region, resulting in a notable improvement in border management and hence 
a  sharp  decrease  of  irregular  arrivals  from  Africa  (Gonzalez  Enriquez,  2009).  This 
externalization of the Spanish border control had its casualties: the Medecins Sans Frontieres 
reported  maltreatment  and  important  violations  of  human  rights  of  Sub Saharan  African 
irregular migrants at the hands of Moroccan border guards (MSF, 2006). However, the success 
of this externalization of border control policies through a combination of fencing (Frontex) 
and  gate keeping  (readmission  agreements)  strategies  was  notable:  each  year,  numbers  of A. Triandafyllidou 
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apprehensions have fallen consistently
1. Apprehensions at the Spanish sea borders in 2011 
stood at 1% of those during the crisis year of 2006 (Table 1 above). 
 
Map 1: Flows of irregular migrants and asylum seekers towards South European border 
islands 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
Of course, the success of the Spanish policies has to be seen in a wider Mediterranean context 
as irregular migration flows and smuggling routes usually do not stop but rather are re directed 
to other points of entry. 
 
Lampedusa and Italy 
 
In recent years, Italy has been experiencing increasing irregular migration and asylum seeking 
flows arriving at its southern coasts from Libya. These flows are composed of migrants coming 
from northern Africa (Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) but also from sub Saharan 
Africa,  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  more  recently  from  Syria.  Irregular  migrants  and  asylum 
seekers, coming across the Mediterranean sea, land at the tiny island of Lampedusa, half way 
between the coast of Italy and Tunisia (Map 2 below). Lampedusa is 185 km (115 miles) south 
of the Sicilian coast, 290 km (180 miles) north of Libya, and only 120 km (75 miles) north of 
Tunisia.  
                                                      
1 The fall in the number of apprehensions of irregular migrants at the Spanish southern borders does not mean that 
irregular  migrants  stopped  arriving  in  Spain.  It  mainly  means  that  they  are  not  crossing  the  Spanish  border 
illegally but rather probably choosing other means to enter the country.                                                         Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum 
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  The  Italian  coastguard  had stepped up its patrolling of the  Lampedusa and Sicilian 
coasts since the mid 2000s; however, the results of these efforts were poor as the area to be 
patrolled is quite vast (see Map 1 above). Sea patrols near Sicily, Lampedusa and the tiny 
island of Linosa were not particularly effective since boats carrying irregular migrants were 
detected  when  they  were  too  close  to  Italian  shores  and  hence  they  had  to  be  brought  to 
harbour. Moreover, there is a controversy between Italy and Malta as to the patrolling of the 
larger sea area south of Malta and south of Italy. Maltese authorities object to the principle that 
migrants have to be disembarked in the closest port of the country that holds the Search and 
Rescue (SAR) area (Caffio, 2011). Italian authorities have accused their Maltese counterparts 
of not guarding the Italian sea waters effectively as they only stop boats that are in distress 
(also Mainwaring, 2008). 
 
 
Table 2: Migrants apprehended at sea borders, Italy: 1999-2013. 
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Source: Data for 1999 2008, UNODC (2010), Table 1, p. 11. Data for 2009 2011, Caritas 
Migrantes, Dossier Statistico, Roma, 2012, p131. Data on 2012 and 2013 based on Frontex 
data. Retrieved from http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/update on central mediterranean 
route 5wQPyW, emphasis added. * Data here refers to Lampedusa only. ** Until end of 
September 2013. Note: n/a = not available. 
 
Italy’s  cooperation  with  Libya  intensified  over  the  last  decade  despite  concerns  about  the 
lawfulness of the Italian government’s re admission practices. As Klepp (2010, p. 4) argues, 
‘secrecy around the details of the agreements that were made and informality characterised the 
co operation  of  Italy  and  Libya  from  the  1990s’  especially  concerning  the  collaboration 
between the security forces. Between August 2003 and December 2004, 5,688 people were 
returned to their alleged countries of origin which included Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria in over 50 charter flights financed partly by 
Italy.  Such  operations  took  place  in  total  neglect  of  the  principle  of  non refoulement  and 
without giving the possibility to irregular migrants that were in need of protection to apply for 
asylum when they arrived in Italy. NGOs and international organizations also report that the 
conditions of deportation were such that sometimes the very survival of the deportees was in A. Triandafyllidou 
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danger  (Pastore  &  Trincheri,  2008).  Despite  the  harsh  tactics  of  the  then  Berlusconi 
government, the passage from Libya to Italy had remained a preferred route for the networks 
smuggling irregular migrants from sub Saharan Africa to Italy and Europe until 2009 while 
entries through the Canary Islands or the Gibraltar strait were sharply reduced. 
  After the Inter ministerial Conference on migration organized in cooperation by the 
European Union and the African Union in November 2006, the Libyan government had agreed 
that  Italian  and  Maltese  coastguard  forces  would  patrol  its  northern  sea  borders  with 
cooperation  from  the  Libyan  forces.  The  then  left  wing  Italian  government  concluded  a 
protocol on maritime cooperation with Libya (2007), allowing Italian navy vessels to enter 
Libyan waters in order to patrol the sea border jointly with Libyan authorities.  The EU had 
also offered help to Libya for the control of its vast southern border in the Sahara desert. 
Italian Libyan  relations  were  further  strengthened  through  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  on 
Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation in August 2008 which promised investments worth 
US$  5  billion  and  cultural  development  aid  to  Libya  in  return  for  its  cooperation  for 
immigration control (Programma Integra, 2008).  Article 19 of the Treaty provided for the 
implementation  of  previous  agreements,  particularly  the  2007  Protocol  on  maritime 
cooperation  and joint sea patrol missions, and the creation of a satellite control system of 
Libyan land borders, to be realised by Italian companies with Italian and EU funds. This part of 
the treaty raised important human rights concerns about the fate of the immigrants turned back 
and  left  in  the  desert  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2009).  While  previous  accords  had  been 
implemented only in part and had no lasting effect on reducing irregular migrant arrivals, this 
one  was  implemented  systematically,  leading  to  a  dramatic  reduction  in  apprehensions  in 
Italian waters or at the shores of Lampedusa. 
  The almost complete stop of irregular migration from Libya to Lampedusa and Sicily 
since 2009 and until January 2011 (Table 2 above) was presented by the Italian government as 
an important policy victory of the government in its efforts to ‘fence off’ the country from 
irregular migrants. The UNHCR (Boldrini, 2010) strongly condemned the Italian accords with 
Libya, and in particular the forced refoulements at sea, back towards the Libyan coasts, which 
actually prevented potential asylum seekers from filing an application and returned them to an 
unsafe country. The Italian government refused these accusations by the UNHCR and other 
international organizations, even if this controversy has significantly damaged the relationship 
between  the  Italian  authorities  and  the  UNHCR  (Boldrini,  2010).  In  February  2012,  the 
European Court of Human Rights condemned Italy for its ‘push back’ operations in 2009 in its 
decision on the Hirsi et al. vs Italy case
2.  
The  externalization  of  border  controls  implemented  by  Italy  involved  the 
externalization of asylum policy not however through the creation of extra territorial reception 
centres but through fencing border control strategies that involved both the Italian and the 
Libyan authorities. Thus the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa, which had been for a good part 
of the 2000s the outer posts of migration control, became ‘internal’ again and the ‘external’ 
dimension  was  enacted  at  high  seas  where  irregular  migrants  and/or  asylum  seekers  were 
intercepted, transferred to Italian coastguard vessels and taken back to the Libyan coasts or 
were disembarked to Libyan ships, without Italy exercizing its jurisdiction (as the European 
Court of Human Rights pointed out in the Hirsi decision) while the migrants were on board 
Italian coastguard ships and hence within Italy’s jurisdiction. Contrary to Spain, Italy did not 
implement  any  gate keeping  externalization  policies;  it  did  not  sign  any  readmission 
                                                      
2 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012).                                                         Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum 
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agreements or imposed any visa requirements on Libya. It simply partly externalized its border 
control through joint patrolling and for the rest left it to Libya to deal with the ‘pushed back’ 
migrants and asylum seekers. 
The beginning of the new decade saw the irregular migrant and asylum seeking flows 
towards the Canary Islands, Lampedusa and Malta coming nearly to a stop. Despite the NGO 
and  international  organizations  outcry  of  Italy’s  cooperation  with  Libya,  the  European 
Commission had signed a ‘cooperation agenda’ with the Libyan authorities in October 2010 
with a view to improving the management of migration flows and control of the external EU 
borders in the region. This cooperation agenda included payments from the EU to Libya of 
about €50 million to help improve its border management capacity. In addition a ‘Framework 
Agreement’ between the EU and Libya was being negotiated with a view to preparing for 
Libya’s readmitting third country nationals who enter the EU after transiting through Libya 
(Amnesty  International,  2010).  These  developments  were  seen  with  growing  concern  by 
humanitarian organizations like Amnesty International as Libya has no asylum system and is 
not a signatory of the Geneva 1951 Convention. 
  The situation changed dramatically in the first six months of 2011 as the social revolt in 
Tunisia led nearly 20,000 Tunisians to leave their country for Italy. In addition, about another 
20,000 sub Saharan Africans (UNHCR 2011) arrived in Lampedusa fleeing the war in Libya 
during the spring and summer of 2011. The Italian government had not prepared the necessary 
infrastructure for receiving these irregular migrants and asylum seekers. The reception centre 
in Lampedusa had been dismantled since October 2009 as it was believed that the cooperation 
with Libya would last and there would be no more significant irregular migration flows there.  
  The new arrivals were initially presented by the government as a dramatic emergency 
(Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi has spoken of a ‘human tsunami’ (Corriere della Sera, 2011; 
also Triandafyllidou & Ambrosini, 2011). In early April, the Italian government decided to 
issue temporary permits (of six month validity) for those who had reached Italian shores before 
5 April 2011.
3 The Italian government probably expected that Tunisian immigrants would head 
to France, where they had family and friends. This decision caused a crisis in Italian French 
relations. Tunisia and Italy signed a Cooperation Agreement on 5 April 2011 which concerned 
police cooperation and readmission of illegally staying migrants, according to which Tunisian 
liaison officers would be dispatched to Italy to undertake accelerated repatriation procedures 
(Campisi, 2011, p. 6). According to the Second Frontex Quarterly Report in 2011, some 1,700 
Tunisians were repatriated between 5 April and 23 August 2011. In contrast, those arriving 
from Libya have sought asylum and have been received as people in need of international 
protection even if the whole issue caused tensions too.   
  This  most  recent  phase  of  the  Italian  migration  control  policies  shows  that 
externalization  had  to  be  reconsidered  and  thus  the  fencing  policies  with  Libya  (abruptly 
interrupted by the civil war) were replaced by gate keeping policies with Tunisia; notably the 
signature of a new readmission agreement. Interestingly, in this last case, the islands become 
the internal external outer post of control as Tunisian authorities are invited to operate on the 
islands with a view to accelerating the procedures. 
   
                                                      
3 Up to 6 April 2011, 390 boats had arrived in Italy, with a total of 25,867 undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers, mainly Tunisian. In total, up to 6 April 2011, only 10 boats had arrived from Libya (Monzini, 2011). A. Triandafyllidou 
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Most recently, during the fall and winter of 2013, the island of Lampedusa has hit the 
headlines across Europe and the world as arrivals have picked up again and 350 people lost 
their lives when their boat sank literally outside the port of Lampedusa in September 2013. 
Most of the people arriving at Lampedusa and Sicily are actually Syrians fleeing their country 
in need of international protection. The tragic events at Lampedusa in September 2013 led to 
notable policy developments including the setting up (by the European Council of 7 8 October 
2013) of a Task Force Mediterranean which studies the measures that need to be taken to 
prevent such losses of human life, to channel asylum seekers in more effective ways and to 
patrol better the Southern EU sea borders. The first report of the Task Force, issued on 4 
December 2013, points to the importance of cooperation with the transit countries, the need for 
a regional approach to protection and resettlement and the importance of showing solidarity 
with Member States that bear the brunt of such flows (European Commission 2013). It also of 
course emphasises the need to reinforcing border surveillance and to combating the smuggling 
and trafficking of migrants. Interestingly the mayor of Lampedusa, Giusi Nicolini, known in 
the  media  for  her  left wing  orientation  and  pro solidarity  views,  and  a  right  wing  Senator 
(Luigi Manconi) have prepared jointly a proposal submitted to the European Council of 24 25 
October  2013  suggesting  that  there  should  be  asylum  seeking  processing  centres  in  North 
Africa which would issue one year permits for international subsidiary protection. Once such a 
visa would be obtained the person in need of protection would be able to apply to go to a 
country where s/he may have relatives. 
  Interestingly these proposals point to the multi level nature of externalization which 
seeks  to  transfer  the  asylum  gate keeping  to  third  countries  while  strengthening  the  local 
fencing of the EU borders through the Eurosur border surveillance system. The cooperation of 
transit countries in the fencing remains important and emphasised but it is unclear how much 
fencing they are expected to do since the Eurosur system is expected to solve all issues through 
technological efficiency. 
 
Malta 
 
The Italy Libya accords affected also the situation of Malta. Malta is the smallest (both in 
terms of area and population) and most densely populated country in the European Union. The 
country has a land area of 316 square kilometres and a resident population of about 410,000. It 
is situated 90 kilometres south of Sicily, 290 kilometres from the northern coast of Tunisia and 
360  kilometres  from  Libya.  In  recent  years,  Malta  has  experienced  irregular  migrant  and 
asylum seeker arrivals mainly from sub Saharan Africa via Libya or Tunisia. The number of 
such immigrants arriving on the island increased dramatically from 57 in 2001 to 1,686 in 2002 
and has remained just below 2,000 people till 2012 included (with the exception of 2003 when 
figures fell to 502) (Table 3 below).  In November 2010, Malta hosted approx. 3,700 African 
migrants (79 in detention, 2,224 in open centres and 1,400 in the community) according to 
official statistics released in November 2010, a far cry from over 10,000 immigrants who were 
estimated to be in Malta in 2008 (Times of Malta, 27 March 2011).  Of the 9,554 immigrants 
that have arrived in Malta in an irregular way during the period 2005 2009, about one third 
were Somali citizens. The second largest nationality group were Eritreans (1,259), followed by 
Egyptians (755), Nigerians (652) and Sudanese (596). (Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012).  
                                                           Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum 
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Malta has an extensive Search and Rescue (SAR) area, based on its Flight Information 
Region, which spans over 250,000 km
2 and which effectively means that every boat leaving 
Libya must pass though Malta’s SAR (see Map 1 above). The Maltese Armed Forces only 
come to the aid of boats in distress in their SAR region and allow others to pass through 
without intervening. The boats asking for assistance are brought into Maltese ports, where the 
immigrants aboard are transferred to one of the detention centres.  
According to Mainwaring (2008), many of the people apprehended and incarcerated in 
Malta had no intention of going to the island and indeed no desire to stay there. They were 
rather looking for ways to move on to Italy and other mainland European countries. Since 2009 
Malta has developed a pilot resettlement program (European Relocation Malta, EUREMA) 
under the aegis of the European Commission (resettling refugees to other EU countries) and 
with the USA (resettling 500 refugees each year to North America). About 1,000 refugees were 
resettled to other EU countries during the period 2009 2010 and the program was to come to an 
end  in  2011.  However,  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Libya,  the  European  Commission 
renewed  the  program  for  one  more  year.  Mainwaring  (2008)  and  several  NGO  reports 
(including Amnesty International, the UNHCR, and the European Council for Refugees and 
Exiles) are particularly critical of the conditions of detention in Malta. Mainwaring also notes 
that detention in Malta was previously possible for an indefinite period of time. It was reduced 
to a maximum of 18 months after the visit of a delegation from the Council of Europe in 2007. 
The data presented in Table 3 below testify to  the fact that landings at Malta of irregular 
migrants  and  asylum  seekers  are  linked  to  those  of  Italy.  In  2010  there  was  a  dramatic 
reduction to only 28 arrivals (similarly to what happened in Lampedusa on the same year); but 
arrivals increased spectacularly again since 2011. 
 
Table 3: Arrival of irregular migrants in Malta: 2001-2013. 
 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
(till end 
July) 
57  1,686  502  1,388  1,822  1,780  1,702  2,775  1,397  28  1,577  1,890  1,294 
 
Source: Data for 2001 2010 from Triandafyllidou & Maroukis (2012), Table 2.5, p. 43. Data 
on 2011, retrieved from http://www.crimemalta.com/frontexwatch.htm  Data on 2012 2013 
retrieved from http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013 07 31/news/record number of 
irregular migrant arrivals for july 2210660356 Emphasis added. 
 
Malta adopts a peculiar externalization policy to control its borders more effectively, without 
having to process a disproportionately large number of irregular migrants or asylum seekers. It 
actually transfers its own sea border control policy to Italy by letting boats from Tunisia and 
(especially) Libya cross towards Italian coasts. It thus indirectly piggy backs on Italy’s policy 
which further externalises the control to Libya. 
 
 
 
 
 A. Triandafyllidou 
 
  18
 
Greece and the Aegean islands 
 
The analysis of the position of the southern European islands in the EU migration control and 
asylum  seeking  policies  cannot  be  completed  without  considering  the  Aegean  islands  in 
Greece.  
The length of the Greek islands’ coasts in the Aegean and their close proximity to the 
Turkish  coast  make  the  policing  of  this  part  of  the  external  EU  sea  border  particularly 
demanding in terms of human resources and technical equipment. The dramatic increase of 
arrivals at the Greek Turkish sea borders from approximately 4,000 to 5,000 per year in the 
period 2002 2005, to double the number (just over 9,000) in 2006 – the crisis year for the 
Canary islands – signalled for the Aegean islands too the start of a new phase in terms of 
irregular  migration  inflows  towards  Greece  via  Turkey.  In  2007  and  2008,  the  number  of 
apprehensions doubled each year (from 9,000 in 2006 to 16,000 in 2007 to more than 50,000 in 
2010), but fell in 2012 and was reduced to a trickle in 2013 (see Table 4).
4 
 
Table 4: Greek-Turkish border apprehensions: 2008-2013. 
 
Border areas  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013* 
Land Border  14,461  8,787  47,088  54,974  30,433  585 
Sea Border  30,149  27,685  6,204  1,030  3,651  5,579 
Total Apprehensions  44,610  36,472  52,269  56,004  34,084  6,834 
 
Source: Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection (2012). * Data for Jan Aug 2013. 
 
The  number  of  apprehensions  generally  indicates  not  only  irregular  migration  or  asylum 
seeking pressures at the borders but also the enforcement efforts of the authorities. Greece has 
beefed up its border controls since 2007. In the autumn of 2007, the Greek border authority 
deployed 200 additional officers in the Aegean sea. In addition, Frontex has been operating in 
Greece since 2006 albeit with increasing intensity in the period 2010 2012. The joint operation 
Poseidon has become now the largest Frontex operation in the Mediterranean. It includes the 
first time ever deployment of Frontex’s Rabit (Rapid Border Intervention Teams, 175 officers 
were sent to the Greek Turkish land border in late October and November 2010 and stayed 
there until March 2011).  In addition, Frontex collaborates in Project Attica which operates in 
the area of voluntary returns, and has six long term stationed focal points. 
  Maroufof (2011) argues that the points of approach/disembarkation of irregular entries 
from Turkey into Greece are shifting constantly. Arrivals have been registered at almost any 
possible place along the eastern coast of Greece (see Map 1 above). However, according to a 
                                                      
4 These sudden changes in the inflows of irregular migrants and asylum seekers from the Greek Turkish sea 
border to the north eastern land border between the two countries along the Evros river show a change in the 
irregular migration and asylum seeking routes in the region. State authorities and Frontex have attributed the 
change to the presence and operations of FRONTEX in the Aegean. However, this does not seem plausible as 
FRONTEX has been operating in the Aegean sea for several years earlier without stemming the increase of 
irregular migration flows into the country through the Greek Turkish sea border and the Aegean islands. The 
completion  of  the  de mining  along  the  Greek  Turkish  land  border  along  the  Evros  river  explains  more 
convincingly this shift in the flows (also Pro Asyl, 2012).                                                         Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum 
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report of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs (2009) during the period between 2006 and 2008, 
95% of those entering from Turkey were apprehended in the islands of Eastern Aegean, and 
mainly in Lesvos, Chios, Leros and Kos. The same trend was observed in 2009. The smuggling 
routes from Egypt, mainly to Crete, have been substantially blocked by the Greek Coastguard 
since 2008 and only a few entries were registered there.  
Those apprehended at the Greek Turkish borders are seldom sent back to their countries 
of origin or Turkey. Greece signed a Readmission Protocol with Turkey in 2002. This Protocol 
however is not implemented in reality. During the period 2006 2010, Greece presented 3,431 
readmission  requests  to  Turkey,  in  the  context  of  this  Protocol,  concerning  62,816  people 
(Hellenic Police, 2011). Of those, 7,359 were accepted for readmission by Turkish authorities, 
but only 1,281 were effectively returned to Turkey. The reason is the overall reluctance of 
Turkey  to  actually  implement  the  Protocol.  While  the  Protocol  foresees  three  readmission 
routes (via the airports of Athens and Istanbul, a crossing point at the Greek Turkish border 
along the Evros river, and the port of Izmir for Turkey and the port of Rhodes for Greece), only 
the land border readmission route is actually used. Turkey continues to refuse to use the port of 
Izmir as a readmission location, claiming that it does not dispose of the necessary human and 
material resources required for the task (Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012, pp. 66, 78). 
The externalization of migration and asylum control policies in the region has had more 
to do with fencing strategies through the operation of Frontex in the region and the building of 
a fence. Attempts to also establish gate keeping policies (such as readmission to Turkey) were 
not successful: Turkey signed the Protocol and thus formally accepted the externalization of 
the Greek Turkish sea border control; but, in practice, it has resisted this externalization and 
did not actually implement the Protocol.  
In the next section of this paper, I seek to assess the relative success and failure of the 
different externalization policies adopted by the four countries studied as well as to consider 
the overall role of the southern European islands in EU migration and asylum seeking control 
policies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The southern European islands attract a large number of immigrants and asylum seekers mostly 
as stepping stones to the continent rather than as destinations as such. Their strategic location 
and  role  is  largely  due  to  the  very  existence  of  the  EU.  They  become  pivotal  areas  of 
externalization: they are at once part of the internal and external dimension of EU migration 
control and asylum policy and are involved as both recipients and agents (or should we say 
victims and perpetrators) of a complex web of externalization policies and practices within the 
EU and from the EU to third countries.  
Often, the main concern for Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece is to keep migration control 
off  their  island  shores.  They  thus  adopt  readmission  agreements  and  joint  border  control 
operation at high seas in order to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from even reaching the 
islands. Thus, control policies are driven out and away from the EU territory either to the high 
seas or possibly to third countries. Indeed our analysis shows that externalizing gate keeping 
has been overall successful with the exception of the Greek Turkish readmission Protocol. 
Maximum  effectiveness  is  achieved  when  combined  with  successful  and  stronger  fencing 
efforts which however can only take place within the EU territory or at sea borders as the brief 
experience of Italy and Libya revealed the problematic nature of externalizing fencing, and the A. Triandafyllidou 
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challenges that this poses particularly for international protection issues. Thus the successful 
recipe  reiterated  in  the  Task  Force  Mediterranean  latest  report  points  to  multi level 
externalization of gate keeping functions through visa regimes, readmission agreements and 
potentially asylum seeking processing  at transit countries combined with higher fencing at 
green and blue EU borders. At the same time, however, our analysis shows that fencing mainly 
leads to the re direction of flows, as the case of Greece suggests; from the green borders to the 
sea borders, or indeed to a diversion of routes towards other EU external borders, notably those 
of Bulgaria with Turkey (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2013; UNHCR, 2013). 
Interestingly though we note that externalization is multi levelled and takes place also 
within the EU. First, countries farther north and west externalize the EU migration and asylum 
control  protocol  to  the  islands  in  the  south.  This  happens  through  the  Dublin  II  (and  III) 
Regulation and the related implementation of the ‘first safe country’ principle. In other words it 
happens through gate keeping policies. Second, there are the manipulations of the Schengen 
area provisions so that multiple fencing takes place: when Italy gave temporary permits to 
displaced  Tunisians,  France  threatened  to  close  its  border  with  Italy  to  avoid  that  these 
Tunisians with temporary stay papers could migrate to France. Third, in the case of the Aegean 
and the Canary islands, this intra EU externalization process is also enacted through Frontex 
participation in fencing operations: Frontex officers operate at the Canary and African coasts to 
prevent migrants from arriving to the islands at all. Frontex officers in the Maltese coasts and 
at  the  Aegean  islands  transform  the  islands  as  the  places  where  European  control  is 
externalized. The islands are the places where fencing takes places, but they are made to be the 
loci of fencing because of the gate keeping policies enacted at the EU level.   
This paper points to the need for framing our understanding of externalization policies 
and practices within a wider web of multi level governance schemes that engage EU and non 
EU actors, at different combinations and for different types of policies. The distinction between 
internal and external externalization as well as between fencing and gate keeping policies and 
practices is important to appreciate the full range of these policy dynamics and the challenges 
that they raise both in terms of effectiveness of migration control and in terms of challenges for 
human rights and international protection obligations.  
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